Lawrence E. Boese Interview

              John A. Adams ’71 Center for Military History and Strategic Analysis.
Cold War Oral History Project
Interview with Lt. Gen. Lawrence E. Boese by Cadet Douglas MacDonald, March 28, 2004
©Adams Center, Virginia Military Institute
About the interviewer:
Cadet Douglas McDonald (’05) aspires to a commission in the U.S. Air Force with a career focusing on
research and development. A native of East Hanover, New Jersey, he is a physics major and an
Aerospace Studies cadet.
McDonald: The following is an interview being conducted for the John A. Adams Center for Military
History and Strategic Analysis in relation to the term paper requirements for HI 216. The interviewer is
Douglas McDonald and the interviewee is Lt. Gen. Boese. Today’s day is the 28th of March 2004. This is
a phone interview. O.K. sir, I’m just going to start off with some background questions. Through what
period did you serve in Vietnam?
Boese: I actually had three different tours in Vietnam. The first one was June of ’68 to June of ’69. Then
I came back to the United States for about six months and then returned in February of ’70 to February of
’71. I went back over a third time in May of ’72 to August of ’72. So I think for Linebacker, you’re
probably looking at the May of ’72 to August of ’72 time frame.
McDonald: During Linebacker, what was your role?
Boese: I was an F-4D/E aircraft commander, instructor pilot and mission commander during Linebacker.
McDonald: What unit were you in?
Boese: During Linebacker?
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McDonald: Yes, during Linebacker.
Boese: The 308th Tactical Fighter Squadron out of Homestead Air Force Base, Florida.
McDonald: And where was your area of operations?
Boese: I was stationed at Udorn Air Base in Thailand which is located in the northern part of Thailand.
Primarily what we were involved with was flying in Laos and North Vietnam. We flew in an area we called
Steel Tiger and Barrel Roll, which basically divided North and South Laos. We also flew in parts of North
Vietnam. We had missions to Hanoi, and Haiphong, and also in the southern part of North Vietnam.
McDonald: Now I’m going to get into some of the politics that revolved around Linebacker. To the best of
your knowledge, what was the objective of Linebacker?
Boese: Now you have to understand that I was a captain in the Air Force so politics were not on my
mind. It was doing the mission we were assigned. You’re not worrying about politics, you’re worrying
about surviving and doing your job. Our mission was to go out and fly the missions that we were tasked
to fly, do the best we could, come back, and do the same thing the next day. Now, many years later I
probably have different thoughts on the political realities of that war. Linebacker, as you know, was
similar to what happened earlier during the TET Offensive. Everything was generally under control and
all of a sudden the North Vietnamese started coming across the border at the DMZ with troops and heavy
movement of supplies. I was stationed at Homestead AFB, Florida, and our squadron was tasked to
deploy to Vietnam which was seemed unusual because we had hundreds of aircraft stationed in Vietnam
and also in Thailand. But because of the North Vietnamese threat several units were deployed to
augment the forces already assigned there. So from an objective standpoint, it was clear to us that we
would be involved with stopping the flow of troops and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam.
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MacDonald: Now I’ll ask how successful do you feel your unit was in accomplishing its missions in
general – how successful were the missions?
Boese: For what we were tasked to do, by and large, we were reasonably successful. We had several
types of missions that we flew, primarily what we call air-to-ground missions or delivering ordnance. Our
squadron was very experienced, so we felt comfortable with the missions that we were asked to do.
MacDonald: Now, during Linebacker, were there many restrictions put on as to what could and not be
hit?
Boese: At the higher levels there probably was. At ours, we didn’t really know. In other words, when
you’re in a squadron and you’re asked to do a mission, you get your target, review the area and
defenses, plan your mission and then try to accomplish it in the best way you can. Whether there were
restrictions on picking the target or not, you don’t know – that wasn’t our responsibility.
MacDonald: For most of your missions, what were the targets? SAM sites, POL sites, etc.?
Boese: We attacked lines of communication, roads, railroad tracks, bridges, supply storage areas and
troops in contact.
MacDonald: O.K., what type of resistance did you face in the way of enemy aircraft or SAM site?
Boese: The major resistance was from air-to-air artillery (AAA). Missions in South Vietnam had light AAA
and small arms. Laos had light to medium AAA. North Vietnam had medium to heavy AAA, surface to air
missiles (SA-2) and MiG 17/19/21 aircraft.
MacDonald: And what do you feel was the deadliest threat that you were faced with?
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Boese: Normally, if I knew there were 22 and 37 mm AAAs in the area, then I was worried. In North
Vietnam, no mission was routine because of the volume of defenses.
MacDonald: What were some of the tactics used during your missions…during Linebacker?
Boese: In Laos and North Vietnam, all the attacks were high altitude/high 30o (night) and 45o (day) dive
angle deliveries. Normally we would be about 18,000 feet, roll in, try to get between 45 and 50 degrees
of dive, deliver around 7,500 feet above the ground so that you could recover 4,500 feet above the
ground. The reason for this delivery tactic is most small arms or small caliber AAA would top out at about
4,500 feet, so we would recover above it. The steeper the dive angle gave you more accuracy and
presented a more difficult target against the AAA.
MacDonald: Are there any other types of aircraft that were involved in your missions, and if so, what
were their tactics?
Boese: Here would be a typical mission going to North Vietnam. You had several aircraft involved. We
normally flew in four ships and would have maybe 20 to 24 strike aircraft. You had an overall mission
commander who was in charge of all the aircraft in the strike package. What we would normally do out of
Thailand, we’d fly up and refuel. The air-to-air aircraft would set up the orbits to defend against the MiGs,
normally F-4 aircraft. Anti-surface-to-air (SAM) aircraft would also set up in their orbits, normally F-105
aircraft. Then chaff was laid out in front of the strike package, normally by F-4 aircraft. After the strike
was completed, reconnaissance aircraft would fly over the target area to get a battle damage assessment
(BDA).
MacDonald: As Linebacker went on over time, did you see a decrease in enemy resistance?
Boese: Yes, considerably, because we had a large number of aircraft and the capability to generally find
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out where they were located. Since 1968, we weren’t going to North Vietnam, so they could store
supplies along the border between North and South Vietnam, along the roads leading into South Vietnam.
Attacking around Hanoi and areas leading to South Vietnam, you could hit them before they could get to
the South. Probably within four to six months after the initial attacks during Linebacker it was pretty much
back to the way it was before the start of the offensive. In August 1972, our squadron deployed back to
the United States because there was sufficient number of permanently stationed aircraft to do the job.
That was just my general assessment. Plus we basically ran out of targets.
MacDonald: You said your first tour of duty started in June of ’68?
Boese: Yes.
MacDonald: So now, from that time to Linebacker, what sort of new technology did you see come out
and how useful was this technology in the way of laser guided bombs or electronic countermeasures and
such?
Boese: The main difference, as we got into the ’72 time frame, was the introduction of the laser guided
bombs (LGBs). Over a period of time they became the weapons of choice. Up until that time, in 1968
and even in the ‘70s, we had only general purpose munitions or unguided bombs—500 pounds, 1,000
pound bombs, 2,000 pound bombs, that you would deliver at 7,500 feet. With laser guided bombs your
precision was much greater. Prior to their use, we would need several aircraft and missions to attack the
same target with general purpose bombs. With laser guided bombs we could go up to North Vietnam
with four or eight aircraft and destroy the targets that it would take 20 to 40 aircraft, if not more, to destroy
the same target with general purpose bombs. And it was also much safer because the laser guided
aircraft could deliver at much higher and safer altitude. I mean, they would release the LGBs in the
stratosphere, then be guided into the target and it would be destroyed. So it was not only much more
effective but it was a whole lot safer. I don’t know if there was any of the aircraft that delivered laser
guided bombs that ever got shot down. We also had, what I would call, increased technology for aircraft
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going after the MiGs. There were a few of the aircraft that could identify an enemy aircraft and confirm
that it was an enemy aircraft and launch their missiles whereas in the early years of the war we would
always have to get a visual before we could ever shoot. Those were just two of the systems that, at least
from my standpoint, made it much more effective and it also made it much safer for the people flying the
missions.
MacDonald: Was there any new sort of countermeasure technology that came out as well, in the way of
ECM pods or technology?
Boese: To tell you the truth I can’t recall any that were actually successful. They tried all different types
of things. It was almost like a research and development lab over there. Anybody that had a brain storm
seemed to try it. Some worked, but most didn’t. We carried ECM pods, but I had little faith in them. We
tried the electronic chaff but by the time the strike package arrived the wind had dissipated it.
MacDonald: Now, during Linebacker, did you ever have to fly any support missions for B-52s?
Boese: No, not that I recall.
MacDonald: I’ve just about asked the questions I wanted to ask. However, the last question I want to
ask you…is there anything I should have asked you but didn’t. I just wanted this to be your time to just
talk about your experience.
Boese: O.K. I’ll mention a few points and these were not only some of my thoughts but those of a lot of
the folks that were over there flying. First, when I was at Homestead Air Force Base and one morning
while I went strolling in, they’d had a recall to deploy. I was on the list and didn’t even receive a call. So
that tells you the status of our squadron for deployment. We just didn’t practice for some reason. For us
to deploy the 24 aircraft from Homestead Air Force Base to Hawaii, and from Hawaii to Guam and from
Guam to Udorn successfully was a miracle. The only reason I think we were successful was because we
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were a very experienced squadron and we improvised as we deployed. As you move forward in time,
when I was a squadron commander, a wing commander, we trained literally every month for deployment.
We knew how to deploy not only the aircraft but the support equipment like the back of our hand. It was
just a huge difference between the time during Vietnam and in the 1980s and later…a major lesson
learned.
Second, we were trained very poorly in the States. The missions that we flew were very basic missions,
and I would call them non-demanding type missions. It always seems like the big emphasis was on
safety—fly the missions and don’t lose an aircraft. You have to balance combat readiness and safety.
One of the things that came out of the Vietnam war was Red Flag which was located at Nellis Air Force
Base. Units would deploy for two weeks and fly to a very high state of combat readiness. The missions
were extremely demanding, very pressure packed, time sensitive and that training exercise evolved into
many other exercises and impacted your day to day training.
Next our units were not very experienced. We took people who had been flying bombers, air defense
aircraft, air training aircraft, gave them a six months training and then sent them over to Vietnam to be a
fighter pilot. I said it takes you two to four years to be even a reasonable fighter pilot—and much longer
to be a mission commander or instructor. So you take people who have never flown a fighter aircraft,
give them six months of training, and expect them to perform as a seasoned veteran. It just doesn’t work,
not just fighter aircraft, but all types of aircraft. The Air Force, if you move forward, now specifies if you’re
going to fly fighters right after pilot training, you go into fighters and you stay in that track for pretty much
your career. The same with bombers, tankers and other aircraft. Finally, the other thing was the need
and the emphasis on precision weapons. Going out and dropping dumb bombs from the altitudes we
were delivering and expecting them to hit targets fairly accurately. To me, it was amazing that we did as
well as we did. The emphasis and need for precision aircraft and weapons certainly came out of
Vietnam. In conclusion, it is my belief the people who served in Vietnam had a mind-set that we were
never going to fight another war like we did Vietnam.
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You can see in the current military leaders today, many of the things that they’re doing in terms of
training, combat readiness, deployability, aircraft systems and weapons evolved from the lessons learned
from the Vietnam War. The current military leadership and the people who went through the Vietnam
War certainly learned a lot of things. I think it changed not only the way we trained everyday but how we
deployed and how we prepared for any type of a conflict. Basically when I left Vietnam, I predicted two
years after we left Vietnam, the North Vietnamese would overthrow the South—and I only missed it by six
months. That’s just because the people in the South, to this day, I don’t think ever knew why we were
there in the first place, while the North Vietnamese were very committed in what they were doing and that
kind of translates into victory in any type of conflict. The North Vietnamese were very intense people and
fighters, and they had a lot of support from their people. We were just basically hitting targets on the
fringes and you just can’t do that unless you’re going to have a long, drawn-out conflict, and the United
States does not like a long and drawn-out conflict. If you don’t have the support of the American public,
we had better not get involved in a conflict. The Vietnam War proved that to us loud and clear—and now
we are facing the same dilemma with the war in Iraq.
MacDonald: O.K. Well, this information has been very useful. Is there anything else you’d like to add?
Boese: No, I think that pretty much covers it from my perspective.